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The Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami Affected Communities of India and Sri Lanka 
project, otherwise known as the “Tsunami Project,” is a three year initiative that aims to 
strengthen the resilience of coastal villages to natural disasters such as cyclones and 
tsunamis. This multi-partner project, which began in 2006, is co-funded by the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) and the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC), and IDRC is also involved in the project as the executive agency on 
behalf of CIDA. The project is being implemented by six partner organizations in 16 
villages in two states (Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu) in India –– and in 12 villages in 
four districts (Galle, Matara, Hambantota and Ampara) in Sri Lanka. This project aims to 
develop and test innovative tools to link ecological rehabilitation and coastal shelterbelt 
forests to improved local livelihoods, in part through village-level access to strategic 
information. The results of the project will demonstrate how new technologies and local 
institutions can reduce the vulnerability of the poor to natural disasters in coastal 
communities. 
 
Early in the project it became evident to IDRC staff that the local partners had limited 
experience working with formal monitoring systems. As a result, a “learning by doing” 
approach to developing and implementing a monitoring system for the Tsunami project 
evolved in consultation with the local NGOs, IDRC and CIDA. A “learning by doing” 
approach was chosen largely out of necessity; IDRC and the partners wanted to benefit 
from using a learning-oriented monitoring system, which would require that the partners 
fully participate in the system’s development and implementation.   
 
A log frame (LFA) was developed at the project’s inception and is being used to guide its 
implementation. It was also decided to integrate Outcome Mapping (OM) into the 
project’s overall evaluation system as a result of the positive experience of a few of the 
NGO staff members’ participation in an OM workshop in March 2005. The project is 
thus using both OM and the LFA.  
 
Capacities in M&E are thus viewed by the donor and implementing agencies as an 
important contribution to the success of the Tsunami project, both for improving project 
activities and for demonstrating results to funding agencies. As such, the project has the 
intention of strengthening project-level skills and techniques in M&E; a set of activities 
that is generally referred to in the literature as “evaluation capacity building” (ECB). 
 
To support the “learning by doing” approach to developing and managing the monitoring 
system, technical support (i.e. ECB activities) has been provided to the implementing 
NGOs throughout the project. IDRC has contracted an M&E consultant from the 
Association for Stimulating Know How (ASK India) to give ongoing “hands-on” support 
for the project partners. As of May 2008, the consultant had conducted two workshops 
that involved all of the partner NGOs, three workshops for the Indian partners and three 
workshops for the Sri Lankan partners. The aim of these workshops has been to develop 
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the monitoring system in a participatory manner and to train the partners in M&E 
methods and other related skills such as facilitation.  
 
As a result of the NGOs’ decision to incorporate OM in the monitoring system, IDRC 
organized a three-day OM workshop in Colombo Sri Lanka in March 2007. All of the 
partner NGOs attended the workshop. The M&E consultant from ASK India also 
attended, as OM was a new methodology for him despite of his vast knowledge and 
experience with M&E. Following the workshop, one of the presenters – Terry Smutylo – 
also gave specific feedback to the NGOs on their OM related plans. 
 
IDRC’s Evaluation Unit (EU), specifically the Senior Program Officer at IDRC’s SARO 
office, has also been providing M&E technical support, and the Tsunami Project 
Research Officer has attended the majority of the monitoring workshops and given her 
support as needed. As of May 2008, the monitoring systems for both the Indian and Sri 
Lankan components of the project had been developed, the monitoring tools have been 
tested and monitoring data was being collected. The project’s official end date is March 
2009. 
 
Purpose of the case study on the Tsunami Project 
 
The purpose of this document is to help the project partners - the partnering NGOs, 
consultants, IDRC and CIDA - to recognize and think more clearly about how using a 
“learning by doing” approach to developing and implementing a monitoring system for 
the Tsunami project has played a role in changing organizational practices in M&E of the 
six partnering NGOs. As a mid-project document, this paper reflects on what the partners 
are learning, as viewed from the latter stages of implementing this three year project.  
 
This report finds that the appreciation and openness among the Tsunami project partners 
(IDRC, CIDA, ASK India and the local NGOs) to both the successes and challenges 
associated with a "learning by doing" approach has created a learning-oriented project 
environment in which the NGO partners have been able to develop their capacities in 




This case study provides a rich description of the donor and implementing partners’ 
experiences with the ECB and monitoring activities associated with the Tsunami project. 
The following summarizes the lessons learned from the various aspects of the ECB and 
monitoring activities.  
 
• The  implementing partners’ unique organizational capacities and roles within 
the Tsunami project has created an opportunity for them to work with and help 
each other, which has proved to positively complement the formal ECB activities. 
The partners have been helping and learning from each other, which has been 
instrumental for a project that involves partners with different levels of capacities 




• Although there were mechanisms built in the project to share the partners’ 
experiences related to a variety of technical areas, specific mechanisms to share 
experience in M&E would have also been beneficial. Although there were 
monitoring workshops that all the partners attended, it would have been beneficial 
to dedicate part of a workshop for the partners to share their experiences in 
monitoring other projects or programs. This type of exchange was done for other 
aspects of the project and seemed quite beneficial. This type of communication 
would not only have helped improve the specific monitoring activities of the 
Tsunami project, but would have also helped IDRC to gain a greater 
understanding of the partners’ experiences with monitoring techniques.  
 
• As the Evaluation Champion for the Tsunami project, the M&E consultant has 
been integral for providing motivation, support and encouragement. According to 
King and Volkov, “The value of evaluation champions is hard to overestimate. 
Although leadership is critical, so too are the activities of people who champion 
the evaluation cause (King and Volkov, 2005; p.13)”. There is little doubt that the 
M&E consultant has played the role of the Evaluation Champion – his vast 
experience, knowledge and enthusiasm for M&E, and development practice in 
general, provided a significant boost to the learning-orientation of the Tsunami 
project.  
 
• There seems to have been some confusion between project-level capacities and 
organizational-level capacities. The objective of the ECB activities for the 
Tsunami project was to build project-level capacities (i.e. to improve the Tsunami 
project), not organizational capacities. Strengthening organizational capacities 
would definitely be viewed as a positive outcome, but was nonetheless not the 
objective of the ECB activities. A purposeful ECB plan would have helped to 
target project-level capacities by basing the ECB objectives and activities on the 
specific needs for monitoring the Tsunami project. For example, a purposeful 
ECB plan could have helped to recognize how OM could have been introduced to 
the monitoring system, and what resources were needed, so that the methodology 
would have been more useful to monitoring the Tsunami project, thus 
contributing to project-level capacities. 
 
• Developing ownership of the monitoring system among the implementing partners 
has been a challenge. However, there have been a number of mechanisms that 
have helped to strengthen ownership. 
 
(1) Developing (as much as possible) a system that reflects the 
implementing  partners’ organizational values. For example, re-
developing the LFA in participatory manner and the use of OM seemed to 
help develop greater ownership of the monitoring system among the 
implementing partners. However, whether ownership has been achieved 
with the Tsunami project is still debatable. The monitoring work for the 
Tsunami project has been driven by the donor agencies – CIDA requiring 
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the use of the LFA and IDRC pushing for the use of a learning-oriented 
monitoring system. CIDA’s requirement for use of the LFA has no doubt 
placed restrictions on the partners’ control over the monitoring system. 
The LFA methodology, as with all evaluation methodologies, comes with 
it a certain set of values, principles and ways of viewing the world. 
Allowing the partners to choose their own monitoring methodology, which 
could very well be the LFA, that fits within their organizational and 
personal philosophies and also that addresses their needs in terms of how 
they value monitoring work, may have helped to increase ownership of the 
monitoring system for the Tsunami project.  
 
(2) IDRC’s and the M&E consultant’s focus  on a learning-oriented 
monitoring system. The learning-orientation emphasized by IDRC and the 
M&E consultant towards the monitoring and ECB activities has been well 
received by the partners, which has helped the partners to value and thus 
develop ownership over the M&E system. 
 
• Linking clear ECB goals, objectives and activities to specific project-based 
timelines may have helped to better manage the relationship between 
manageability and robustness of the monitoring system. The Tsunami project has 
had difficulties with timelines in terms of the monitoring work, and this can 
partially be attributed to the time that has been required for the ECB activities to 
come to fruition. A purposeful ECB plan, attached to specific project-based 
timelines, could have helped to outline what was needed to achieve the 
monitoring goals, how the ECB activities would contribute to this, and from what 
schedule this would be achieved. A more detailed ECB plan, linked directly to 
project-based goals and timelines, would have helped to ensure that the ECB 
objectives and activities were based on the needs for monitoring the Tsunami 
project and thus focused on project improvement. Flexibility is important and 
should remain a priority, but nonetheless, developing a purposeful ECB plan 
would help to establish clear project-based objectives, goals and timelines for the 
ECB activities, and as a result, help to ensure a robust, yet manageable monitoring 
system. 
 
• Incorporating specific learning objectives on M&E in a conflict environment may 
have helped the project partners in Sri Lanka to better monitor the project 
activities in the east of the country. There is a significant amount of literature and 
best practices on conducting M&E in a conflict setting. It would have been useful 
to include these lessons in the ECB activities.   
 v 
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The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is currently in the third year of 
coordinating and managing a three year IDRC and Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) co-invested project, Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami-affected 
Communities of India and Sri Lanka. The “Tsunami Project” is being implemented in 
partnership with two local NGOs in Sri Lanka – Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement 
(Sarvodaya) and Practical Action (P.A.),1 and four NGOs in India – M.S. Swaminathan 
Research Foundation (MSSRF), in partnership with three grassroots NGOs: People’s 
Action for Development (PAD), the Society for Participatory Research and Integrated 
Training (SPRIT), and Praja Pragathi Seva Sangam (PPSS).2
 
 
Early in the project it became evident to IDRC staff that the local partners had limited 
experience working with formal monitoring systems. As a result, a “learning by doing” 
approach to developing and implementing a monitoring system for the Tsunami project 
evolved in consultation with the local NGOs, IDRC and CIDA. A “learning by doing” 
approach was chosen largely out of necessity; IDRC and the partners wanted to benefit 
from using a learning-oriented monitoring system, which would require that the partners 
fully participate in the system’s development and implementation.   
 
A log frame was developed at the project’s inception and is being used to guide its 
implementation. It was also decided to integrate Outcome Mapping (OM)3
 
 into the 
project’s overall evaluation system as a result of the positive experience of a few of the 
NGO staff members’ participation in an OM workshop in March 2005. The project is 
thus using both OM and the LFA.  
This paper explores how using a "learning by doing" approach to developing a robust, 
learning-oriented, yet value driven monitoring system for the Tsunami project is playing 
a role in changing organizational practices in M&E among the partner NGOs. As a mid-
project document, this paper reflects on what the partners are learning, as viewed from 
the latter stages of implementing this three year project.  
 
                                                 
1 Sarvodaya is IDRC’s direct partners. Sarvodaya works with P.A. to implement the project activities.  
2 MSSRF is IDRC’s direct partner. MSSRF works with SPRIT, PPSS and PAD to implement the project 
activities.  
3 Developed by IDRC in 2001, Outcome Mapping (OM) is a methodology for planning and assessing 
development programming that is oriented towards change and social transformation. OM provides a set of 
tools to design and gather information on the outcomes, defined as behavioural changes, of the change 
process. OM helps a project or program learn about its influence on the progression of change in their 
direct partners, and therefore helps those in the assessment process think more systematically and 
pragmatically about what they are doing and to adaptively manage variations in strategies to bring about 
desired outcomes. OM puts people and learning at the centre of development and accepts unanticipated 
changes as potential for innovation. To learn more about OM please see IDRC’s Evaluation Unit’s website 
at http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-26586-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html; or the Outcome Mapping Learning 
Community’s website at http://www.outcomemapping.ca/. 
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There are seven further sections to this paper: section two outlines the research 
methodology; section three introduces the Tsunami project; section four briefly reviews 
the literature on evaluation capacity building and describes the framework used to 
conduct this research; section five discusses some of the challenges and opportunities 
associated with the “learning by doing” approach; section six looks at the process of 
developing ownership, a monitoring system that reflects organizational values, and the 
focus on a utilization/learning-oriented monitoring system; section seven explores the 
challenges and trade-offs associated with trying to develop a manageable yet robust 









2.0 Research Methodology 
 
The purpose of this document is to help the project partners - the partnering NGOs, 
consultants, IDRC and CIDA - to recognize and think more clearly about how using a 
“learning by doing” approach to developing and implementing a monitoring system for 
the Tsunami project has played a role in changing organizational practices in M&E of the 
six partnering NGOs. This study has consisted of four major research components:  
 
1. A review of the literature on evaluation capacity building (ECB) and the 
theoretical foundations of Outcome Mapping (OM) and the Log Frame Approach 
(LFA), including discussions on integrating the two approaches. 
 
2. An in-depth file review of Tsunami Project documents that relate to the 
monitoring or ECB activities. 
 
3. A review of IDRC documents on projects that have used both OM and the LFA; 
 
4. Key informant interviews with relevant IDRC program staff, Evaluation Unit 
staff, project consultants and representatives of the implementing NGOs. In 
addition, the research conducted several strategic interviews with the aim of 
developing a broader conceptualization of the research themes.  
 
5. Process observation during site visits in April/May to see how the monitoring 
component of the project is being implemented and to provide technical assistance 
where appropriate. The researcher participated in the fourth monitoring workshop 
in Machilipatunm, Andhra Pradesh from April 7 to 10, 2008. The researcher had 
planned to also attend the third monitoring workshop in Sri Lanka, but was unable 
to because of unforeseen circumstances. Interviews with the Sri Lankan partners 







Despite the magnitude and extent of impact from the December 2004 tsunami in South 
Asia,4 it has been reported that loss of lives and properties behind mangrove wetlands and 
other thick coastal vegetation was reduced by these natural bio-shields or bio-barriers. 
Communications systems and information on coastal hazards also mitigated the impact of 
the tsunami: in those few villages where warnings were provided by telephone or a public 
address system linked to international information sources, loss of life was avoided (e.g. 
Nallavadu village, Pondicherry). While the December 2004 tsunami event was extremely 
rare, these coastal areas are subject to regular hazards from storms, floods and other 
natural disasters. Experience has shown that the resilience of the poor to natural disasters 
in coastal communities increases as livelihoods are made more secure and diverse.5
 
 
The Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami Affected Communities of India and Sri Lanka 
project, otherwise known as the “Tsunami Project,” is a three year initiative that aims to 
strengthen the resilience of coastal villages to natural disasters such as cyclones and 
tsunamis.6 This multi-partner project, which began in 2006, is co-funded by CIDA and 
IDRC, and IDRC is also involved in the project as the executive agency on behalf of 
CIDA. The project is being implemented by six partner organizations in 16 villages in 
two states (Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu) in India –– and in 12 villages in four 
districts (Galle, Matara, Hambantota and Ampara) in Sri Lanka.7
 
 This project aims to 
develop and test innovative tools to link ecological rehabilitation and coastal shelterbelt 
forests to improved local livelihoods, in part through village-level access to strategic 
information. The results of the project will demonstrate how new technologies and local 
institutions can reduce the vulnerability of the poor to natural disasters in coastal 
communities. 
There are four key dimensions to developing coastal community resilience that are 
addressed in this project: (1) bioshield and natural resource management, (2) timely 
access to information and communications, (3) livelihood strengthening, and (4) building 
strong local governance for disaster preparedness and management. In addition, the 
partners agreed that they will collaborate to develop strategies for determining and 
addressing the sources of gender inequality in the project, such as recruiting a gender 
                                                 
4 On December 26th, 2004, India and Sri Lanka experienced one of their worst natural disasters. 
An earthquake of magnitude 9.0 struck Indonesia off the West Coast of Northern 
Sumatra followed three hours later by another earthquake 81 km west of Pulo 
Kunji, Great Nicobar. These two earthquakes triggered giant tidal waves, which hit 2260 km of 
Indian coastline on the Southeast coast and more than 1000 km of Sri Lanka along its North, 
East and Southern coasts, causing massive amounts of damage. Estimates suggest that more than 31,000 
people were killed in Sri Lanka and approximately 11,000 people were killed in India. 
More than two million people were affected by this disaster in the two countries, with the number of 
displaced at approximately 1 million (Fritz Institute, 2005). 
5 Tyler, Steven, “Joint Proposal to IDRC and CIDA” 
6 Please see Appendix #2 for a timeline of the project activities. 
7 Please see Appendix #3 and #4 for detailed maps of the project sites. 
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balanced project staff or conducting gender analysis to better understand gender-
differentiated outcomes of the project interventions.8
 
 
The context of the Tsunami project is relatively complex. The Tsunami project is being 
implemented in a post-disaster situation (i.e. post tsunami) and in Sri Lanka the project is 
operating within a conflict environment, which has had a particular impact on the project 
activities in the east of the country. The effects of this “complex-emergency” setting are 
discussed further in Section 5.4. This project is also multi-site, with implementation 
activities at the village and district levels in both India and Sri Lanka. It is also a multi-
language project at both the country and village level. The complexities associated with 
geography and language are discussed further in Section 5.1.  
 
The Tsunami Project is managed collaboratively; however, IDRC, as a donor and 
executing agency, takes the overall administrative responsibility, including reporting to 
CIDA (see Diagram #1 below). IDRC hired a full-time project coordinator (Tsunami 
Project Research Officer) who began her duties in July, 2006. This person is located at 
the IDRC South Asia Regional Office (SARO) in New Delhi, which is the office 
responsible for the financial administration of the project. The project coordinator 
provides administrative oversight as well as coordination support for the project. A 
Senior Program Officer, based at IDRC SARO, assumes the overall management 
responsibility of the project. The Regional Controller at SARO also provides support for 





IDRC Project Management 
and Administration team:
• Senior Program Officer 
(25%-30%)
• Project Coordinator 
(100%)
• Regional Controller (5%-
10%)
• Program Assistant (50%)
Project Advisory 
Committee (PAC)
MSSRF Project Leader and 
India Management Team
Sarvodaya Project Leader and 
Sri Lanka Management Team
Project Activity Teams
(MSSRF, PAD, PPSS, SPIRT)
Project Activity Teams
(Sarvodaya, Practical Action)




The Project Advisory Committee (PAC) provides overall guidance on issues related to 
strategic management and direction of the project. The membership of the Committee 
was negotiated and agreed upon by both the implementing and funding organizations.9
                                                 





The practical leadership for the project, particularly for implementation of activities at the 
field level, comes from MSSRF in India and Sarvodaya in Sri Lanka. MSSRF is 
partnering with three grassroots NGOs that manage the project at the field level: SPRIT, 
PAD, and PPSS. Sarvodaya is partnering with P.A., which is responsible for 
implementing the project activities in two villages in Sri Lanka. In terms of reporting, 
IDRC coordinates all the reporting requirements to CIDA, but relies on technical and 
financial reports submitted by the Sri Lankan and Indian partners.  
 
From the beginning, monitoring has formed an integral component of the Tsunami 
project, used as a tool for both improving project activities and for demonstrating results 
to funding agencies. A log frame was developed at the project’s inception and is being 
used to guide its implementation. It was also decided to integrate Outcome Mapping 
(OM) into the project’s overall evaluation system as a result of the positive experience of 
a few of the NGO staff members’ participation in an OM workshop in March 2005. The 
project is thus using both OM and the LFA. It is also expected that the project will carry 
out both a mid-term evaluation, conducted either by the NGOs themselves or an 
independent consultant (this has not yet been decided), and a final evaluation, which will 
be conducted by an independent consultant. 
 
To support the “learning by doing” approach to developing and managing the monitoring 
system, technical support has been provided throughout the project. IDRC has contracted 
an M&E consultant from the Association for Stimulating Know How (ASK India) to give 
ongoing “hands-on” support for the project partners. As of May 2008, the consultant had 
conducted two workshops that involved all of the partner NGOs, three workshops for the 
Indian partners and three workshops for the Sri Lankan partners. The aim of these 
workshops has been to develop the monitoring system in a participatory manner and to 
train the partners in M&E methods and other related skills such as facilitation.  
 
As a result of the NGOs’ decision to incorporate OM in the monitoring system, IDRC 
organized a three-day OM workshop in Colombo Sri Lanka in March 2007. All of the 
partner NGOs attended the workshop. The M&E consultant from ASK India also 
attended, as OM was a new methodology for him despite of his vast knowledge and 
experience with M&E. Following the workshop, one of the presenters – Terry Smutylo – 
also gave specific feedback to the NGOs on their OM related plans. 
 
IDRC’s Evaluation Unit (EU), specifically the Senior Program Officer at IDRC’s SARO 
office, has also been providing M&E technical support, and the Tsunami Project 
Research Officer has attended the majority of the monitoring workshops and given her 
support as needed. As of May 2008, the monitoring systems for both the Indian and Sri 
Lankan components of the project had been developed, the monitoring tools have been 
tested and monitoring data was being collected. The project’s official end date is March 
2009. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Please see Appendix #5 for the PAC’s Terms of Reference. 
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The purpose of this document is to help the project partners - the partnering NGOs, 
consultants, IDRC and CIDA - to recognize and think more clearly about how using a 
“learning by doing” approach to developing and implementing a monitoring system for 
the Tsunami project has played a role in changing organizational practices in M&E of the 
six partnering NGOs. It is the opinion of this report that the appreciation and openness 
among the Tsunami project partners (IDRC, CIDA, ASK India and the local NGOs) to 
both the successes and challenges associated with a "learning by doing" approach has 
created a learning-oriented project environment in which the NGO partners have been 






4.0 What is Evaluation Capacity Building? 
 
According to Anne Bernard (2005), 
 
“In the context of IDRC, capacity refers generally to the ability of individuals, 
communities and institutions to generate, use and promote knowledge in ways 
which support equitable and sustainable development. Capacity development 




Capacities in M&E are viewed by the donor and implementing agencies as an important 
contribution to the success of the Tsunami project, both for improving project activities 
and for demonstrating results to funding agencies. As such, the project has the intention 
of strengthening project-level skills and techniques in M&E; a set of activities that is 
generally referred to in the literature as “evaluation capacity building” (ECB). 
 
ECB is not a new form of development assistance; UNDP and USAID, for example, have 
been conducting ECB activities since the 1960s (Schaumburg-Müller, 1996).  
Nonetheless, as a result of the new public service management paradigm – based largely 
on the pressures for demonstrating accountability of public funds – that swept through 
developed countries throughout the 1980s and 90s, ECB has become an increasingly 
important form of both development assistance and domestic public investment.  
 
Despite the history of ECB in the development assistance field, in the evaluation 
literature ECB is described as an “emergent field of practice, with an emergent overall 
process, actual practices, occupational orientation, and practitioner roles that form the 
ECB structural elements” (Stockdill et al., 2002c; p. 113). The American Evaluation 
Association, in fact, only began to discuss ECB as a formal concept at its 2000 
presidential address. There was other writing on ECB before this –often termed 
differently than ECB or Evaluation Capacity Development (ECD) – but the literature has 
been rather sparse.  
 
In the spring of 2002, the American Evaluation Association journal, New Direction for 
Evaluation, set out to provide a first mapping of ECB as a process and practice (Stockdill 
et al., 2002b). From this, a conceptual definition for ECB was elaborated as: 
 
“… a context-dependent, intentional action system of guided processes and 
practices for bringing about and sustaining a state of affairs in which quality 
program evaluation and its appropriate uses are ordinary and ongoing practices 
                                                 
10 There is much discussion on and tension surrounding the terms “capacity building” and “capacity 
development,” some preferring “capacity development” as it more recognizes that capacities are 
strengthened (i.e. recognizing initial capacities) rather than built from nothing. The reason the term 
“capacity building” was used for this paper is because the term “evaluation capacity building” is the most 
accepted term used in the evaluation literature. 
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within and/or between one or more organizations/programs/sites (Stockdill et al., 
2002b; p.109).” 
 
Although there are many other definitions of ECB (Schaumburg-Muller, 1996; 




Building evaluative capacity in the NGO sector 
 
It is important to distinguish between ECB in the NGO sector and ECB in the public 
sector, as they involve different sets of principles, approaches, tools and methods 
(Stockdill et al., 2002b). For example, government bureaucracies are often much larger 
and more complex than NGOs, thus making evaluation much more difficult to integrate 
into decision making processes. ECB efforts in the public sector, therefore, often focus on 
reforming systems, structures and institutions. On the other hand, NGOs are more likely 
to lack appropriate resources, such as M&E training, equipment or M&E budgets. ECB 
activities with NGOs thus often focus on training in practical hands-on skills, such as data 
collection and analysis or facilitation.  
 
But equally important, NGOs and governments play different roles within the M&E 
context, and these roles often interact with one another. Governments most often play the 
role of the donor agency, are usually the sponsors of evaluation, and thus largely control 
the evaluation agenda. NGOs on the other hand rarely control the agenda and are more 
often the subject of evaluations (i.e. their performance is being examined). Thus, there is 
not only a dichotomy of differences between ECB approaches for the government and 
NGO sectors, but relationships between the two sectors that also influence ECB 
approaches and activities. 
 
The focus of this study is ECB in the NGO sector, as the purpose of the “learning by 
doing” approach is to strengthen the evaluation capacity of the six local NGOs that are 
responsible for implementing the Tsunami project. An improvement in the partners’ skills 
in M&E, it is hoped, will help to strengthen the learning-orientation of the Tsunami 
Project. Using M&E, the partners will know more about what has been successful, where 
improvement can be made, and be better able to demonstrate results to the funding 
agencies.  
 
The framework used for this study, as depicted in Diagram #2 below, is based on a model 
developed by Jean A. King and Boris Volkov (2005). This model outlines the important 
components of a successful ECB strategy. These include resources – access to technical 
training and educational materials; structures – such as a strategic plan for the ECB 
activities; and an understanding of both the internal and external context and how this 
interacts with the ECB activities. This framework was chosen because it is specific 
enough to allow a dissection of the ECB efforts of the Tsunami project and is intended 
for analysis of ECB activities of NGOs.  
                                                 





• Purposeful ECB plan for the project
• Infrastructure to support the 
evaluation process
• Purposeful socialization in to the 
evaluation process
• Peer learning structures
Resources
• Access to evaluation 
resources
• Sources of support for 






Diagram #2 - Framework for ECB





5.0 A “Learning by Doing” approach to ECB  
 
The “learning by doing” approach for the Tsunami project has created opportunities for 
the local partners to work through, and learn from, a variety of the challenges and 
opportunities associated with developing and implementing a project-level monitoring 
system. Before discussing some of these challenges and opportunities, however, it is first 
necessary to provide a brief understanding of what is meant by a “learning by doing” 
approach to ECB.  
 
What is a “Learning by doing” Approach? 
 
The concept of a “learning by doing” approach is very much related to the relationship 
between capacity building and learning. Anne Bernard (2005) describes this relationship 
well: 
 
“Capacity development and learning, while obviously related, are not the same 
things. The first is a more instrumental concept, capacities tending to be “for” 
something, specific sets of knowledge or skills needed by someone in order to get 
the job done, whether that job is doing research or living a better quality of life. 
Capacity development, therefore, implies someone deciding on his/her own, or for 
someone else, that a particular knowledge or skill is needed, and intervening in 
some way to enable its acquisition (Bernard, 2005; p.1).” 
 
“Learning, on the other hand, is something intrinsic, a natural, internally-driven 
and personal process of coming to understand, and to better manage, oneself in 
the social and physical environment. (Bernard, 2005; p.1).” 
 
Capacity development is therefore more of a purposeful act directed for an intended use, 
whereas learning is much more of a personal and ongoing process that can’t as easily be 
defined or structured. Preskill (2008) further elaborates stating that, “although there are 
many definitions of learning, most suggest that learning is inextricably linked to change – 
changes in thinking, changes in behaviour, and/or changes in beliefs” (Preskill, 2008; 
p.129). 
 
Emphasizing the components of a “learning by doing” approach, Meadows, Randers, and 
Meadows (2005) describe this type of learning process:  
 
‘learning means the willingness to go slowly, to try things out, and to collect 
information about the effects of actions including the crucial but not always 
welcome information that the action is not working. One can’t learn without 
making mistakes, telling the truth about them, and moving on.  Learning means 
exploring a new path with vigour and courage, being open to other people’s 
exploration or other paths, and being willing to switch paths if one is found that 




The premise of linking learning to doing is further elaborated by Bernard (2005): 
 
“the more a learning activity is grounded in the reality of a learner, linking theory 
to practice and unknown to known, the more likely it is: 
 
 that accommodations and adaptations between existing and new 
conceptual frameworks and behaviour patterns will be made, and 
 that various components of the learning task will build incrementally 
on, and reinforce, each other: (Bernard, 2005; p.20).” 
 
“Learning by doing” therefore also refers to linking theory as closely as possible to 
practice, and having a willingness to try, make mistakes, and learn from those mistakes.  
 
For the Tsunami project, the capacity to use M&E to improve the project’s activities 
necessitates a certain set of skills, behaviours and knowledge among the implementing 
partners. The approach to learning these skills has been based on the premise that the 
NGOs can learn the appropriate M&E skills by working through the challenges of 
actually developing and implementing a monitoring system – with the support of M&E 
technical experts – and at the same time develop and manage a robust monitoring system. 
 
The “learning by doing” approach to ECB, in the context of the Tsunami project, thus 
refers to: (1) the purposeful assessment that the partner NGOs require greater capacities 
in M&E in order to utilize monitoring methods for the Tsunami project, (2) an explicit 
goal of developing the NGOs’ capacities in M&E as specifically related to the Tsunami 
project, and finally, (3) that by working through the challenges of developing and 
implementing a monitoring system – with the support of technical M&E experts – the 
NGOs would be able develop and apply their newly learned M&E skill sets in order to 
develop and manage a robust monitoring system. 
 
5.1 The challenges and opportunities of working with multiple 
layers of partners  
 
The multiple layers of partners involved in the Tsunami project – partners working in 
different regions and countries, implementing partners versus lead organizations, and 
partners with different levels of capacity in M&E – have created challenges for the ECB 
activities, particularly the monitoring workshops, but have also provided opportunities for 
the different organizations to help each other and work off each others’ strengths. Each 
partner has required a different set of M&E skills depending on their role in the project, 
and different needs in terms of strengthening their M&E skills. At the same time, each 
partners’ unique organizational capacities, and role within the Tsunami project has 
created an opportunity for them to work with and help each other. 
 
There are six implementing partners. MSSRF is the lead agency in India and takes overall 
responsibility for implementing the project activities and for reporting to IDRC. MSSRF 
directly implements the project activities in one village in Andhra Pradesh and one 
village in Tamil Nadu, but works with three local NGOs – SPRIT, PAD, PPSS – to 
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implement the project activities in the other villages and districts. Sarvodaya is the lead 
organization in Sri Lanka and also implements the majority of the project activities, but 
partners with P.A. in implementing and reporting on the project activities in two villages.  
 
As the lead implementing agencies for the Tsunami project, MSSRF and Sarvodaya 
require different M&E related skill sets, and also have different baseline capacity levels, 
compared to the other project partners. Both MSSRF and Sarvodaya are accountable for 
all project activities in each country and thus for all reporting requirements to IDRC 
(although Sarvodaya does share reporting responsibilities with P.A.). They are 
responsible for developing and managing the entire monitoring system, including 
ensuring that quality monitoring data is being collected at the village and district levels, 
proper analysis of the data, and ensuring that this analysis is feeding into decision making 
and reporting at the village, district and project levels. 
 
This requires in-depth knowledge of the entire M&E process, from understanding the 
system as a whole, to the intricacies of collecting data at the village level, to 
understanding how the whole process leads to strategic decision making and reporting at 
the project level. They are responsible for managing the relationship between themselves 
and both IDRC and CIDA and with the numerous other partners involved in the Tsunami 
project including: other local NGOs, local governments, village members, etc. Both 
MSSRF and Sarvodaya therefore require a diverse range of skills from project 
management and project-level strategic planning and reporting, to field-based skills such 
as data collection and facilitation involving community members.  
 
On the other hand, the partners that are involved only in implementing the project 
activities (PAD, SPRIT, PPSS, and to a lesser extent, P.A.) have a much more specific 
role. Although they do have a role in developing the monitoring system as a whole, as 
this process has been based on participatory principles and thus has involved all of the 
partners, they are primarily concerned with data collection, decision making and 
reporting at the village and district levels. They therefore require mostly field-level skills 
such as data collection, facilitation, data analysis, and decision making and reporting at 
the village level.   
  
As one might imagine, the lead and implementing organizations also vary considerably in 
their levels of ability in M&E. Previous to the Tsunami project, all of the organizations 
used a variety of monitoring and evaluation techniques to improve on their projects and 
to test various models of development. For example, P.A. has their own specific method 
for monitoring project activities, whereas Sarvodaya often uses consultancies to conduct 
their evaluation work. Thus, it is important to emphasize that all of the organizations do 
have considerable experience in a variety of M&E techniques. However, these are mostly 
informal and not necessarily based on structured ongoing learning-oriented assessment in 
relation to results, using indicators, and involving different stakeholders. M&E is also not 
institutionalized within the organizations – M&E is conducted on a project-by-project 
basis and they don’t have centralized human resources (i.e. M&E units) for M&E. 
Generally speaking, the assessment by IDRC staff was that the group, as a whole, had 
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limited experience with and human resources dedicated to (including evaluation units) 
formal monitoring systems that are based on measuring results.  
 
MSSRF and Sarvodaya, however, are much bigger and more complex than the other 
organizations, and thus do have greater resources and needs for M&E as a result of being 
accountable for a larger budget and to a greater diversity of donors. Both MSSRF and 
Sarvodaya have specific staff who work solely on M&E activities (i.e. M&E technical 
advisors); however these staff work at the project level rather than at the corporate level. 
The other project partners do not have staff dedicated to working on M&E. Again 
because of their size and experience, Sarvodaya, MSSRF, and also P.A., also have more 
experience than the other organizations in social science research methods, which serve 
as strong foundations for M&E related work. 
 
These differences between the lead and implementing organizations – the different skill 
sets they need, and their different levels of capacity – have created both challenges and 
opportunities. The challenges have been particularly evident with the Indian side of the 




The M&E consultant who has been facilitating the ongoing workshops has acknowledged 
the challenges associated with developing capacities among such a diverse group (see 
sidebar). It has clearly been difficult to conduct 
workshops for participants who have very different 
learning needs and capacity levels. As discussed 
above, MSSRF has different learning needs and a 
higher level of capacity then the other implementing 
organizations in India. As a result of this higher 
capacity, and also their position as the lead 
organization, MSSRF staff have naturally taken the 
lead in the workshops and often the staff of the 
other NGOs have been much less vocal. This has 
been made further difficult by the fact that the 
workshops have been conducted in English (the 
common language among all the participants) and 
the staff of the smaller NGOs have demonstrated a 
lower level of comfort with discussing their opinions in English in front of the entire 
group. The workshop facilitator has used small group work to address this problem, and 
MSSRF staff have provided translation, which has helped to facilitate greater 
participation. Nonetheless, the lack of equal participation has made it difficult to assess 
the level of understanding amongst staff of the smaller organizations at the workshops 
and the gaps in their knowledge that need to be addressed. Most importantly, because the 
workshops have not been targeted to the capacity level of the grassroots organizations 
and because of MSSRF’s natural dominance during the workshops and the language 
issues noted above, the staff of these organizations have not been able to take full 
advantage of the monitoring workshops by learning new skills and fully contributing to 
the development of the monitoring system. 
The three layered system: 
IDRC, MSSRF and the three 
NGOS (Spirit, PAD, and 
PPSS) has created challenges 
in terms of building M&E 
capacity within the project. 
Simply the number of people 
involved creates challenges in 
developing capacity.   
 





The Sri Lankan workshops have had similar difficulties, but were more related to the fact 
that the participation of the senior staff of both Sarvodaya and P.A. was much greater 
than the more junior staff in both organizations. Following discussions between the 
workshop facilitator and the partners in regards to this challenge, it was decided that it is 
more important that the field staff focus on their field work, and that any changes in the 
monitoring system would be communicated to them by the project lead staff. As a result, 
the third workshop was only attended by five of selected project staff from Sarvodaya 
and P.A. All the partners felt that this approach worked well and that the workshop ran 
much more smoothly and efficiently. The project staff also felt very confident in their 
ability to communicate all necessary aspects of the workshop outcomes to the field staff. 
 
The monitoring workshops, however, have not only been training exercises, but have also 
involved developing the monitoring system in a participatory manner, and thus it has 
been very critical that representatives from each of the partner organizations have 
attended each workshop.12 In both India and Sri Lanka, all the organizations and most of 
the project staff have attended each of the workshops.13
 
 The large number of people 
involved and their different language abilities have posed a significant challenge for 
designing and running the workshops. Simultaneous translation was tried at the Sri 
Lankan workshops, but it was found not to work very well because of the amount of back 
and forth conversation. The Indian partners used local languages during group work and 
English and simultaneous translation during plenary sessions, which, as mentioned above, 
resulted in poor participation of the grassroots NGOs during the plenary sessions. 
Now that the monitoring systems have been finalized with both the Indian and Sri Lankan 
partners, and recognizing the difficulties associated with having all of the staff attend 
each workshop, the M&E consultant has suggested that the final upcoming workshops 
only involve senior staff who can then communicate any changes to the field-level staff. 
It is hoped that by only having senior staff attend the workshops, the workshops will be 
easier in terms of language issues, but will also be more focused on the specific needs of 
the participants and be based on their level of capacity in M&E. The only danger is the 
possibility of loss of ownership among the field-level staff. It is thus crucial that senior 
staff ensure that they keep the field-level staff well informed of decisions around the 
monitoring system, and also that they provide some sort of semi-structured training that is 
specifically relevant to their capacity needs.  
 
Similar to most projects, power dynamics between the project partners have also created 
some difficulties. Power dynamics have not only been related to respective roles within 
the project (i.e. between donor and implementing agencies), but as discussed above have 
also been related to language (i.e. greater abilities in English) and also capacities in social 
science research and M&E, in which IDRC, MSSRF and Sarvodaya staff are dominant.14
                                                 
12 It should be noted that a consultant had originally developed the LFA, but that the partner organizations 
revised it in a participatory manner. Please see Section 6.1 for more details on the development of the LFA. 
 
13 As discussed above, the Sri Lankan partners switched approaches after the 2nd workshop. 
14 There could also be other factors (for example, class, caste, etc.) that are simply beyond the reach of this 
research because of the researchers’ “outsider” perspective. 
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Again, the M&E consultant approached this well by conducting a lot of group work 
during the workshops, which has minimized difficulties with language and has spread 
experience equally throughout the groups, but the effects of power relations have 
nonetheless been a challenge throughout the monitoring process, particularly in relation 
to ownership of the monitoring system. As will be discussed further in Section 6.0, the 
monitoring work for the Tsunami project has been driven by the donor agencies which 





The diversity of skills in the NGOs has also presented a number of opportunities for the 
monitoring processes. For example, the staff from MSSRF have been playing the role of 
supporting the grassroots NGOs in monitoring the project activities. MSSRF has been 
working with the local NGOs in each step of the development of the monitoring system, 
such as developing indicators and tools for collecting quantitative and qualitative data. 
When breaking into small groups during the monitoring workshops, one MSSRF staff 
would work with each of the other NGO groups. Similarly, when breaking into groups to 
conduct field tests of the monitoring tools, MSSRF staff would lead their group and play 
a training role. 
 
In fact, MSSRF has actually named their partner NGOs as Boundary Partners15 using the 
OM methodology. Working with the partners they have developed a set of Progress 
Markers that map out how the partners’ capacities will be increased through the duration 
of the Tsunami project.16
 
 For example MSSRF would “love to see” their partners, 
“mobilizing funds to sustain and expand the present project programmes”. Hinting 
towards monitoring, MSSRF would “like to see” their partners “carrying out internal 
reflections on the progress and report as per the terms.” MSSRF is thus assuming a 
mentoring role with their relationship with their partner NGOs. However, it should be 
noted that there were no actual direct references to either monitoring or evaluation in the 
set of progress markers.  
Although not necessarily directly related to M&E, the partner NGOs who are stronger in 
a specific area have also been helping other partners who have less experience. MSSRF 
has been helping the project partners in Sri Lanka – Sarvodaya and P.A. – in bio shield 
management and with Village Knowledge Centres (VKCs). Within Sri Lanka, Sarvodaya 
has been learning from P.A. in the area of livelihood development, whereas P.A. is 
learning from Sarvodaya skills in implementation.  
 
For example, in July 2007 project staff from the Indian organizations visited a village 
called Barhamanawatta in the Galle District of Sri Lanka to get exposure to the Village 
Information Centre (VIC) established by Sarvodaya and the Disaster Early Warning 
                                                 
15 According to the OM manual, “Boundary partners are those individuals, groups, or organizations with 
whom the program interacts directly and with whom the program can anticipate opportunities for influence 
(Earl, Carden, and Smutylo, 2001) 
16 Please see Appendix #5 for the set of Progress Markers. 
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System established by LIRNEasia. Further, an expert from MSSRF in establishing 
mangrove and on-mangrove bio-shield was requested by IDRC to provide inputs to the 
bio-shield programmes of Sri Lankan project partners Sarvodaya and P.A. These are just 
a few examples, as there have been many more. 
 
There were also joint monitoring meetings – the OM workshop and the first monitoring 
workshop – in which all of the Indian and Sri Lankan partners participated. However, it is 
unclear if at these joint workshops time was given for the partners to share each others’ 
experiences in monitoring, such as techniques they have used in the past, or more 
generally, lessons they have learned from monitoring other projects. Dedicating part of a 
workshop session to sharing these experiences might have proved beneficial, not only to 
help the partners in monitoring the Tsunami project, but also so that IDRC and the M&E 
consultant would have a better idea of how the partners have used monitoring in the past. 
 
5.2 Learning through practice. 
 
To support the “learning by doing” approach, the Tsunami project has incorporated a 
number of mechanisms to help facilitate the development of the monitoring system and 
also build the NGOs capacities in M&E related skills. This has mainly involved ongoing 
monitoring workshops17
 
 - there have been eight thus far where the NGOs have tested 
monitoring tools, practiced data analysis and facilitation techniques and learned new 
methodologies. The workshops have also been a forum for feedback and encouragement. 
The fourth monitoring workshop held in India provides an interesting example. One of 
the purposes of the workshop was to test the qualitative monitoring tools that had been 
developed at the previous workshops, and also the Progress Markers associated with the 
OM methodology. The larger workshop team was broken down into three separate groups 
and each group was tasked with “testing” one of the monitoring tools in a village called 
Sorlagundi. The next day each group reported on the challenges and successes in 
implementing the monitoring tools, and the tools were adjusted accordingly. For 
example, it was decided that a few of the qualitative indicators were redundant for  
the tool that was used to assess the quality of the bio-shield and thus they were removed. 
 
One area in which some of the teams demonstrated difficulty was in facilitating group 
exercises with the villagers. Facilitation, however, is also an area that the M&E 
consultant is quite strong in and therefore he was able to provide support and 
encouragement during the “testing” exercises, and also feedback once the teams 
reconvened. The consultant recognized, as a result of his participation in this “testing” 
exercise, that more training was required in relation to facilitating discussions on gender, 
concepts of community participation and process documentation, and he proposed that 
the next workshop include training on these aspects. Facilitation skills have also been 
viewed as important among the Sri Lankan partners. In fact, for one of the Sri Lankan 
project staff, learning facilitation skills has been one of the areas that has been most  
                                                 
17 See Appendix #6 for a list of the workshops and there intended outcomes. 
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valuable (see sidebar). This experience – learning 
facilitation skills through the monitoring workshops 
– also demonstrates how learning monitoring-
related skills leads to other learning dimension and 
provides an overall complement to programming. 
 
The M&E consultant has also been learning through 
practice; not only learning through his work with 
the Tsunami project, but also by having to learn a 
new M&E methodology. Since the NGOs decided to use OM to complement the LFA, 
the consultant, not being familiar with OM before working on the Tsunami project, has 
also had to learn the intricacies of OM. He has done so by attending an OM workshop, 
but also through facilitating the use of OM for the Tsunami project. Being quite familiar 
with OM, IDRC’s Evaluation Program Officer from the SARO office has helped the 
M&E consultant with this process by supporting the Tsunami projects’ work on OM.  
 
This sort of back and forth learning – trying, making mistakes, receiving feedback and 
then trying again – is, as was discussed in Section 3.0, invaluable. Learning processes are 
simply much stronger when theory is taught in close relation to practice, and the 
“learning by doing” monitoring workshops have integrated theory with practice as tightly 
as possible. The project partners do seem to be learning through this process. As one of 
the Sri Lankan partners noted in relation to the OM methodology – “OM was confusing 
at the beginning, but later on it became much easier”. 
 
5.3 “Learning by doing” takes time 
    
For the partners of the Tsunami project, learning and implementing M&E has not been 
completely driven by project timelines, but has also been based on what the partners have 
been able to achieve. This flexibility has proven to be both a strength and a drawback, but 
might also be considered a necessity, as simply stated, learning takes time. An example of 
a learning process that has required flexibility has been how the partners have approached 
learning and implementing OM. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the NGOs decided to integrate OM into the project’s overall 
evaluation system as a result of the positive experience of a few of the NGO staff 
members’ participation in an OM workshop in March 2005. This led to IDRC’s SARO 
EU Evaluation Program Officer to organize an OM workshop for all the project partners 
in March 2007.  
 
Using OM for the Tsunami project has been somewhat of a challenge for the partners as 
learning and implementing two different M&E methodologies at the same time has been  
quite demanding, especially considering the project timelines (see sidebar on next page). 
The result has been that the partners have simplified the implementation of OM to what 
they feel is manageable. This is a completely appropriate approach, as taking on too 
What has been important for 
me is learning the little things, 
the practical skills such as 
good facilitation. 
 




much would have simply resulted in poor 
implementation, and is what in fact OM practitioners 
at IDRC and on the OM Learning Community 
recommend. 
 
As of May 2008, both the India and Sri Lankan teams 
had selected a few Boundary Partners and established 
Progress Markers, but had not yet begun to collect 
monitoring data. As described earlier, the Indian team 
is trying a unique approach to OM. MSSRF has 
named their partner NGOs as their Boundary 
Partners, and in consultation with them, has 
established a set of Progressive Markers. The Indian 
partners are implementing OM in a complementary 
manner to the LFA (i.e. they have not attempted to 
integrate the two approaches), whereas in Sri Lanka 
the partners have made some attempt to integrate OM with the LFA – mostly involving 
cutting down on the Progress Markers and including the Progress Markers in the LFA. 
While the partners have made progress at the planning stage of OM, they have not yet 
begun to develop a system for monitoring the Progress Markers. 
 
In terms of the OM workshops, a couple of the partners mentioned that they would have 
liked to have received more training on the practical elements of OM, such as how to 
measure and monitor Progress Markers. One of the partners noted that, “this [monitoring 
Progress Markers] was done in a few quick slides and the key message was you can 
decide how you want to monitor – it’s up to you.” Noting this, an IDRC staff in a trip 
report stated,  
 
“…I would suggest that in future OM trainings more material be presented on 
monitoring progress markers including presenting sample monitoring data to 
trainees and going over specific examples of selecting the parameters of LMH 
[Low, Medium, High] (especially qualitative parameters).” 
 
It has also been recognized by IDRC staff that the monitoring component of the Tsunami 
project began too late and that this has affected the implementation of OM. As one IDRC 
staff member noted in a Trip Report of one of the monitoring workshops:  
 
“An overall challenge is that the relatively short timeframe of the project and the 
slow start on M&E will limit how far the project will get in implementing the 
monitoring and evaluation system. However, though they will not be able to 
gather many rounds of results within the current timeframe they will develop the 
capacity to use RBM and OM from the planning, monitoring (and hopefully the 
evaluation) stage.” 
 
Despite these challenges, using OM does seem to have benefited the individuals and 
organizations involved in the Tsunami project. The partners have expressed the fact that 
Doing both [OM and the LFA] 
has been challenging – both in 
terms of developing capacity 
in two methods and the extra 
burden of implementing two 
methods – we didn’t know this. 
It would have been useful if 
OM was established earlier 
when implementation was lean 
– learning and implementing 
OM simply needed more time. 
 





OM is well suited to their personal and organizational philosophies, and have also 
suggested that they will use OM in other projects. Particularly, all of the organizations 
very much value their relationship with the communities in which they work and 
understand that communication is key to this relationship. OM, some of the partners have 
suggested, is a tool that helps to structure and facilitate dialogue with the communities 
and thus is valuable for developing and maintaining the participation of community 
members in decision making processes. As will be discussed further in section 6.1, this 
link between methodology and personal/organizational philosophy has helped to build 
ownership of the monitoring system among the implementing partners. 
 
However, the benefits of using OM for the Tsunami Project do seem to be limited as 
monitoring data on the Progress Markers have not yet been collected and there are only a 
few months left in the project. The ECB activities related to OM have therefore 
developed organizational-level capacities, but have been limited in terms of developing 
project-level capacity.  
 
Another example of the fact that “learning takes time” was in implementing the 
monitoring system as a whole. The M&E consultant noted the following at the second 
monitoring workshop with the Indian partners: 
 
“It was realized that this (monitoring of qualitative results in a systematic 
manner) was a new area for most participants. […] There was a consensus that 
this approach of scaling up monitoring coverage in a graduated manner may be a 
better idea and it will also allow the participants to focus on implementing of the 
project which is at a crucial stage and phasing in the monitoring step by step at a 
time and pace that will be more comfortable and not very overwhelming.” 
 
The “learning by doing” approach has required patience and understanding, and all the 
Tsunami project partners have understood this reality and approached the monitoring 
component of the Tsunami project as a learning exercise. This learning approach has, 
fortunately, not had a significant impact on grant performance management (i.e. the 
implementing partners reporting to IDRC and then from IDRC to CIDA). Although some 
of the reports from the implementing partners have been delayed, the semi-annual reports 
to CIDA from IDRC have been on time, of high quality and deemed adequate by CIDA. 
 
5.4 A post-tsunami environment and the conflict in Sri Lanka 
 
The Tsunami project has been, and continues to be, implemented in the context of what 
can be referred to as a “complex emergency”. According to Hallam (1998), 
 
“The term ‘complex emergency’ was coined in Mozambique in the late 1980s as a 
way for aid agencies to acknowledge that humanitarian assistance needs were 
being generated by armed conflict as well as by periodic ‘natural disaster’ events, 
such as cyclones and droughts, while avoiding the use of terms such as ‘civil war’ 
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and ‘conflict’ which were sensitive terms in the Mozambican context at the time 




“While some consider the use of the term ‘complex emergency’ unhelpful, as it 
implies that some disasters are not ‘complex’, the term is useful in that it 
highlights the fact that situations involving political instability and armed conflict 
do make a difference to the way in which humanitarian problems can be tackled. 
These differences, in turn, have implications for the evaluation processes (Hallam, 
1998; p.21).” 
 
There are two factors that have contributed to a complex emergency setting for the 
Tsunami Project: the post-tsunami environment in both India and Sri Lanka and the 
ongoing civil conflict in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
Post-tsunami environment in India and Sri Lanka 
 
On December 26th, 2004, India and Sri Lanka experienced one of their worst natural 
disasters in recorded history. An earthquake of magnitude 9.0 struck Indonesia off the 
West Coast of Northern Sumatra followed three hours later by another earthquake 81 km 
west of Pulo Kunji. These two earthquakes created giant tidal waves, which hit 2260 km 
of Indian coastline on the Southeast coast and more than 1000 km of Sri Lanka along its 
North, East and Southern coasts, causing extensive amounts of damage. Estimates 
suggest that more than 31,000 people were killed in Sri Lanka and 11,000 in India. More 
than two million people were affected by the tsunami in the two countries, with the 
number of displaced at approximately 1 million (Fritz Institute, 2005). 
 
The reactions to the tsunami were vastly different in each country. The Indian 
government declined international assistance for the relief operations, declaring that 
sufficient resources were available to assist those made vulnerable. After an initial delay, 
the Sri Lankan government requested international assistance. In both countries, the 
government, local NGOs, international NGOs already operating within the country, the 
private sector and religious groups participated in an unprecedented relief effort (Fritz 
Institute, 2005). 
 
This was the most rapidly and generously funded disaster relief operation in history: 
US$13.5 billion was pledged or donated internationally for emergency relief and 
reconstruction, including more than US$5.5 billion from the general public in developed 
countries. The budgetary constrains normally associated with humanitarian relief did not 
exist. 
 
According to the Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami: Synthesis Report, written by the Tsunami Coalition, the large funding levels 
and relief response by the international community also produced a number of negative 
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outcomes. Particularly, because of the need to spend large amounts of money quickly, 
international NGOs did not always make the best use of local resources. 
 
“Exceptional international funding provided the opportunity for an exceptional 
international response. However, the pressure to spend money quickly and visibly 
worked against making the best use of local and national capacities. TEC studies 
do not find that many international agencies lived up to their own standards with 
regard to respect and support for local and national ownership: where local and 
national capacities were recognised, they were often applied in strengthening 
international agencies more than local responses. ‘[L]ocal ownership… was 
undermined and some local capacities were rendered more vulnerable’ (TEC 
Capacities Report, 2006, p9). Many efforts and capacities of locals and nationals 
were marginalised by an overwhelming flood of well-funded international 
agencies (as well as hundreds of private individuals and organisations), which 
controlled immense resources. (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, 2006; p.18).” 
 
Further, the large amounts of funding also meant that organizations and actors with less 
experience were becoming involved in the relief effort. 
 
‘Generous funding not only exceeded the absorption capacity of an overstretched 
humanitarian industry and deprived it of its customary excuse for built-in 
systemic shortcomings, but also led to the proliferation of new actors with 
insufficient experience and therefore competence, as well as to established actors 
venturing into activities outside their normal area of expertise (Tsunami 
Evaluation Coalition, 2006; p.20).’ 
 
It is difficult to assess how much this post-tsunami relief context played a role in the 
Tsunami project, and specifically on the project’s capacity building activities. However, 
we do know that the Tsunami project was under significant pressure to spend the 
project’s budget within a specific frame of time. This resulted in the need to start the 
project quickly and to limit the project to a three-year timeline. These time pressures may 
have played a role in terms of the depth of the Project’s capacity building activities. A 
longer project time-line would have allowed for more planning around the ECB activities 
and for greater depth of learning. 
 
 
Conflict in Sri Lanka 
 
In addition to the post-tsunami environment, the escalating conflict in Sri Lanka has had a 
significant impact on the project activities in the east of the country, including on the 
monitoring work. The government of Sri Lanka has been involved in an ongoing civil 
war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for over two decades. Although 
the conflict had subsided in the early 2000s, the conflict again escalated following the 
presidential elections in November 2005. The LTTE began attacks on government 
security forces with the intention of provoking war. The government initially reacted with 
restraint, but full-scale fighting began in July 2006 in the East that led to a major 
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campaign to retake the large areas under LTTE control. After approximately a year of 
conflict, in which hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced and tens of 
thousands of homes damaged, destroyed and looted, the government declared the East 
liberated from the LTTE in July 2007. Fighting then intensified at the end of 2007 as the 
government attempted to retake areas in the north. Since September, the government has 
repeatedly stated that it is committed to defeating the Tigers militarily (International 
Crisis Group, 2008).  
 
In addition to fighting in the north and east, in 2008 there has been the assassinations of a 
government minister and a Tamil opposition member of parliament, multiple bombings in 
Colombo, a number of attacks on civilians in the south, and disappearances and killings 
of civilians in the north and east. More than 5,000 combatants and civilians are estimated 
to have been killed over the past two years. At least 140,000 have left intensified fighting 
in the north, and more are likely to be forced out if the military continues its operations 
(International Crisis Group, 2008).  
 
The increased fighting in Sri Lanka has resulted in difficulties in the project activities in 
the East, including the monitoring work. The following are some of the main issues that 
were raised by the Sri Lanka project staff in terms of the monitoring activities: 
 
• Interacting with the community members in the East of Sri Lanka has been 
difficult. Village members in the East are frustrated with the conflict situation, 
and are thus generally not willing to participate in the project activities, including 
the monitoring activities. Fear has also been affecting people – the general fear of 
living in a conflict environment has made people scared to provide information, 
making it difficult for the Sri Lankan staff to collect monitoring data. Connecting 
people is very difficult and community mobilization is essentially impossible. 
Villagers are frustrated with their situation and thus want more action and don’t 
want to spend time in meetings.  
 
• Movement has been as been restricted because of the conflict. The project 
team has had to stay 30-40 kilometres from the project site because of security 
issues. Movement is generally difficult; there are many vehicle checks and 
restricted areas. Further, there were recently two elections in the east of Sri Lanka, 
which has made security even worse and has resulted in a police curfew and less 
access to the project sites. The project staff can’t work independently because of 
security and the monitoring work often looks suspicious, for example, when 
monitoring the mangrove forests. Finally, it is not possible for management staff 
to visit the project sites very often as it takes nine hours and is risky in terms of 
security.  
 
• Constant Change. Because of the conflict, the project context is constantly 
changing. The project starts working on a particular aspect of the project, but then 
activities have to change because of changes in the context. Progress has 




• Staff turnovers and the resulting low staff capacity. Because of high staff 
turnover, overall staff capacity and moral is quite low.  
 
The monitoring activities in the east of Sri Lanka have therefore been quite severely 
limited as a result of the conflict in that area. One recommendation of this report is that 
the ECB activities should have incorporated learning objectives on conducting M&E in a 
conflict environment. Several of the Sri Lankan partners mentioned that this would have 
been useful. There is a significant amount of literature and practical recommendations for 
conducting M&E in a conflict setting, and thus it would have proved useful to discuss 




6.0 Developing Ownership and an Overall Learning-oriented 
Project Environment 
 
As the monitoring component of the Tsunami project has largely been donor driven there 
have been challenges in terms of ownership of the monitoring system among the 
implementing partners. The “learning by doing” approach, however, and the focus on a 
learning-oriented monitoring system has helped to develop ownership of the monitoring 
system among the partners, and in general, foster an overall learning-oriented project 
environment.  
 
The Tsunami project is co-funded by CIDA and IDRC. CIDA requires that all of its 
projects, including the Tsunami project, use an LFA for planning, monitoring and 
evaluation. At the planning stages of the project, the project consultant who designed the 
initial Tsunami project proposal also developed a results matrix (i.e. an LFA). Following 
the first “all partners planning meeting,” the implementing NGOs then used this initial 
LFA as a basis to develop a full LFA according to the specific realities of the Sri Lankan 
and Indian sites, and on what the NGOs, in consultation with community partners, felt 
that they would realistically be able to achieve. The final version of the LFA was not 
finalized until December 2007 – half way through a three year project. 
 
IDRC has not required that the Tsunami project use a specific M&E methodology or 
framework, but has pushed for the partners to develop and use a utilization/learning-
oriented monitoring system (see sidebar). A 
utilization/learning-oriented monitoring system is 
one in which learning to improve on the program 
activities takes centre stage. Those who are 
implementing the project activities are the primary 
users of the monitoring system and they are the 
ones who dictate the questions being asked. They 
then use the information collected from the 
monitoring system in order to make decisions 
regarding project activities. With a 
utilization/learning-oriented monitoring system, 
therefore, the primary users dictate what 
information is needed from the monitoring system. 
The system is designed for their benefit so that they 
can make better decisions on how the program is 
being implemented and how activities can be 
improved. 
 
IDRC wanted the Tsunami project to develop a 
monitoring system that would help the implementing partners learn throughout the 
project and thus improve on the project activities. The adoption of OM, which was agreed 
to by the partners at the inception stage of the project, partially resulted from IDRC’s 
push for a utilization/learning-oriented monitoring system. That is not to say that IDRC 
“IDRC’s approach to evaluation 
is utilization-focus and does not 
advocate any particular 
evaluation content, model, 
method, or theory. By promoting 
appropriate methodology for 
particular use, the Centre 
acknowledges that no one 
methodology suits every 
situation. Rather the primary 
intended users of evaluations 
should select the most 
appropriate focus, methodology 
and approach”  
 
(IDRC, 2008; p.4). 
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isn’t also interested in ensuring that the partners comply with accountability 
requirements, but that learning-oriented goals are of equal importance.  
 
There has been good communication between CIDA and IDRC on the monitoring 
activities, mostly through technical reports. The final LFA had to be approved by CIDA, 
but there has generally been a relationship of trust. According to IDRC’s Research 
Officer, “they are confident in what we do and we make an effort to keep them posted on 
the project activities”. 
 
The M&E work for the Tsunami project, regardless of being based on a learning-oriented 
system or a specific methodology, has therefore been driven by the donor agencies – 
CIDA and IDRC. This has created problems in terms of ownership of the process among 
the implementing NGOs. The M&E consultant has noted that it is always better if the 
implementing organizations asks for help rather than the donor agencies directing this  
help (see sidebar). To some degree, the implementing partners have felt that the 
monitoring work has been a cumbersome addition 
to the implementation process. For the partners, it 
has thus been a matter of juggling between the 
implementation and monitoring work. One of the 
IDRC staff involved in the project, in fact, 
suggested that because of the top down approach 
– that the LFA is a requirement and was originally 
developed by a consultant – that some of the 
partners’ management feel that the monitoring 
work is a necessity rather than a priority. Thus, 
for at least some of the implementing partners, the 
“top-down” approach to the monitoring system 
for the Tsunami project has limited ownership of 
the monitoring system among the implementing partners and has resulted in M&E 
becoming less of a priority. 
 
From the point of view of the donors, however, there are simply some aspects of a project 
that are non-negotiable – they simply must be done regardless of whether or not the 
process is driven by the implementing partners or by the donor agencies. M&E is often 
one of those issues, as M&E is much too important to be pushed aside. Donors face a 
significant amount of pressure to demonstrate accountability of spending public funds 
and this translates into pressure on partners to demonstrate results to the funding 
agencies. Nonetheless, as the Tsunami project has progressed, there have been a number 
of factors that have helped to increase ownership of the monitoring system among the 
implementing partners. There has been an attempt to develop a monitoring system that 
reflects the implementing partners’ organizational values, and the focus on a learning-
oriented monitoring system has helped the NGOs to value and recognize the importance 
of monitoring as a learning tool for program improvement. Whether these have been 
adequate remains open to debate. 
 
It is always better if the 
implementing organization 
asks for help in a certain area 
rather than the donor agencies 
directing this help as there is 
always more uptake and 
ownership. It has taken time to 
develop ownership among the 
NGOs. 
 





6.1 Developing a system that reflects organizational values 
 
Devolving as much control of the monitoring process as possible to the implementing 
partners has helped the partners to develop a monitoring system that reflects their 
organizational values. This has resulted in the partners developing greater ownership of 
the monitoring system as a whole. As mentioned in the previous section, the donor 
agencies have required the partners to use an LFA, but were otherwise encouraged to 
develop a system that reflects their values and that addresses their needs. 
 
Participatory principles of inclusion, being an important philosophical approach for all of 
the implementing partners, has shaped both the process of developing the monitoring 
system and also the actual monitoring system itself (see sidebar below). The development 
of the monitoring system, from constructing the LFA to establishing Progress Markers for 
OM, has been based on participatory principles. All of the implementing NGOs have 
been involved in the monitoring 
workshops and thus have all played a role 
in developing the monitoring system. 
Community partners, including villagers, 
have also been consulted in this process 
and have been instrumental in developing 
and testing the qualitative monitoring tools 
and the OM Progress Markers. 
 
Participatory principles are also paramount 
to the actual monitoring system itself. 
Constructive feedback from village 
members forms an integral part of the 
qualitative data collection. The qualitative 
data collection tools, which require in-
depth consultations with village members, 
include:  
 
• the assessment of the bio-
shield; 
• the assessment of the quality of 
the bio-shield management 
plan; 
• the assessment the percentage of women / men / underprivileged groups out of 
those assisted who feel benefited from VKC/VIC assistance; 
• the assessment of the percentage of assisted BPL families / women headed 
households who have improved their income; 
• the assessment of the participation in decision making (of Men, Women and 
the marginalized community) 
• the assessment of the participation in project activity (of Men, Women and the 
marginalized community);  
“Strengthening Resilience of Tsunami 
Affected Communities “(SRTAC) can be 
considered as one flag ship project 
implementing by Sarvodaya. There is no 
doubt M & E procedure of that project 
would reflect our organizational values. 
As you know SRTAC project has bottom - 
up participatory monitoring approach. 
That mean village community/ 
beneficiaries, village and district level 
staff as well as head office staff are 
involved in M & E. Through the 
implementation of the M & E system, 
addition to the monitoring by staff; 
beneficiaries are able to monitor the 
project output and outcome. That mean 
M & E system would help to empower the 
grass root”. 






The adoption of the OM methodology has also helped to develop ownership of the 
monitoring system. OM has resonated well with the implementing partners. They have 
found that OM is useful as a tool for structuring dialogue with the communities, for 
assessing more nuanced variables such as empowerment, as a tool for looking specifically 
at behavioural changes, and in general, as a tool that has the potential to increase learning 
in the project. For example, one of the Sri Lankan partners noted that OM is useful when 
carrying out long-term planning discussions with the communities about what they would 
like the community to look like three years from now. Others mentioned that the LFA is 
important, but fails to identify empowerment and that OM has more potential in this area.   
 
This section is not intending to state equivocally that the Tsunami monitoring system 
completely represents the values of the implementing organizations, but rather that there 
have been specific measures that have helped to increase this likelihood. The 
participatory process of developing the monitoring system, the participatory nature of the 
monitoring system itself, and the use of OM are all examples of ways in which the 
implementing partners have infused their organizational values in the monitoring process. 
 
6.2 Recognising the importance of using monitoring as a 
learning tool 
 
Ownership of a process is only possible if that process is valued. Similarly, ownership of 
the monitoring component of the Tsunami project is only possible if monitoring is valued 
by the implementing organizations. IDRC’s and the M&E consultant’s focus on a 
use/learning-oriented monitoring system, rather than stressing aspects of accountability, 
has helped to create a learning-oriented project environment that has been valued by the 
implementing partners.  
 
All too often, evaluation is associated solely with accountability to donor agencies, which 
can produce negative perceptions. In this case, IDRC has stressed the fact that the 
monitoring system for the Tsunami project, while having to address certain accountability 
elements, should primarily focus on learning and improving, both related to the project 
activities themselves and also organizational practices. The M&E consultant has 
continually stressed that the monitoring work is intended to improve learning and 
decision making processes, and highlight organizational capacities that need to be 
improved, such as gender analysis, community 
participation and facilitation skills. 
 
This push for a learning-oriented M&E system seems to 
have been well received by the implementing partners. 
According to one of the Sri Lankan project staff, the 
approach of learning from mistakes, the learning focus of 
the project, has been one of the most important aspects of 
the Tsunami project. For him, “the system itself has been 
learning for the implementing partners.”  
The approach of learning 
from mistakes, the 
learning focus of the 
project, has been one of 
the most important 
aspects of the Tsunami 
Project. 
 







The other partners have also demonstrated that they have valued this focus on learning. 
For example, one of the Indian partners – PAD – has approached the M&E consultant to 
have him work with them on another project – demonstrating that they have valued the 
monitoring process with the Tsunami project. 
Another Sri Lankan partner has noted that, 
“for me, personally, there have only been 
positive outcomes as related to capacity 
building in M&E of the Tsunami project.” 
 
As already discussed above, another example 
of the partners valuing the learning focus of 
the Tsunami Project has been their enthusiasm 
for the OM methodology. Again, the partners 
chose to incorporate OM largely because it is 
a learning-oriented monitoring tool. OM is 
simply not intended to address accountability 
functions, as the LFA performs this role quite 
well (see sidebar). A number of the partners 
have mentioned that they plan to use OM for 
other projects, suggesting that they value 
OM’s focus on learning. 
 
 
“Of the three evaluation mechanisms, 
RBM and its associated tools are 
designed primarily for accountability. 
[…] Outcome mapping is designed 
mainly for planning, and learning 
from, complex development projects 
that rely for their success on the 
changes and actions introduced by 
many external organizations. The 
methodology compels users to 
disaggregate organizational 
relationships, action and behavioural 
changes in to discrete, progressive, 





7.0 Minimizing the Trade Offs  
 
Working with local partners to develop and maintain a robust yet manageable monitoring 
system has presented a number of challenges and trade-offs. The challenges, however, 
have been mitigated to some degree through ongoing and on-demand M&E technical 
support, which has been possible because of the inclusion of a specific budget line 
dedicated to both internal and external M&E. A specific budget line for M&E has 
therefore been extremely critical to the success of the “learning by doing” approach to 
ECB. 
 
7.1 Manageability versus robustness 
 
The major trade off with the “learning by doing” approach has been between the 
manageability and robustness of the monitoring system; essentially, the system has been 
scaled back (in terms of the amount and quality of the data being collected) in order to 
make if more manageable for the partners. As discussed above, the “learning by doing” 
approach requires that all the partners dedicate a significant amount of time to the 
monitoring and ECB activities. The partners have not only had to spend time 
implementing the monitoring activities, as normally required for any program or project, 
but have also had to spend a significant amount of time and project resources on the ECB 
activities (i.e. the workshops, etc.), and also the extra time that is needed to implement 
monitoring activities as a result of being novices in this area. It simply takes more time to 
implement monitoring activities as a beginner than it does for someone who is more 
experienced. 
 
For the tsunami project, the extra time commitment has resulted in a number of trade offs. 
The M&E consultant, for example, wrote in one of his workshop reports: 
 
“What emerged was the team had actually not begun using the system designed 
in the August workshop. There were not very clear reasons except that the team 
was busy in implementation tasks and had not taken up monitoring as per the 
designed system.” 
 
Time for the Tsunami project has been very tight; in fact implementation activities were 
behind from the very beginning of the project. The extra time required by the “learning 
by doing” approach added to this busy schedule resulting in less time being dedicated to 
actually implementing core monitoring activities. Thus, the major trade off has been the 
robustness of the monitoring system, including the quality of the system and the amount 
monitoring data that has been able to be collected. Examples of this, which have been 
explored in other sections of this paper, include the fact that LFA had only been finalized 
and that monitoring only seriously began by the beginning of 2008, which is almost two 
years in to a three year project. Further, it is unlikely that the partners will have 
monitored the OM Progress Markers by the end of the project. The partners might have 
been able to do more if the project had been longer, but three years is a short time-frame 
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to allow for slower learning processes such as those that have evolved with the 
development and management of the monitoring system. 
 
As described by the quote below, the implementation of OM was simplified substantially 
in order to foster the manageability of the system: 
 
“We [IDRC and M&E consultant] have been monitoring on an ongoing basis in 
order to provide support as needed. It’s just that it’s a new area, they feel it’s 
difficult and challenging. However, OM was simplified to address this.” 
 
- IDRC staff member 
 
Similarly, the monitoring system as a whole was implemented incrementally in order to 
ensure the process was manageable for the NGOs: 
 
“There was a consensus that this approach of scaling up monitoring coverage in a 
graduated manner may be a better idea and it will also allow the participants to 
focus on implementing of the project which is at a crucial stage and phasing in the 
monitoring step by step at a time and pace that will be more comfortable and not 
very overwhelming (Chaturvedi, 2008).” 
 
Developing a more detailed and purposeful ECB plan at the beginning of the project may 
have helped to better negotiate this relationship between manageability and robustness. 
The terms of reference between IDRC and ASK India did clearly outline that the capacity 
building should lead to the implementing organizations learning and applying systematic 
monitoring and evaluation based on quantitative and qualitative indicators, including 
progress markers, and that this should lead to better learning from experience for the 
organizations. This objective was also articulated with the implementing organizations 
and each monitoring workshop also had a specific agenda with clearly articulated 
expected results. 
 
However, linking more detailed learning objectives for the ECB activities (learning 
objectives based preferably on a prior analysis of the partners’ organizational capacity in 
M&E) to project-based timelines might have helped to ensure that the ECB activities, and 
thus the monitoring activities, were more directly linked to objectives and timelines 
related to project improvement. With the “learning by doing” approach, the ECB 
activities and schedule have been directly linked to completing the monitoring work for 
the Tsunami project – the partners have needed develop the monitoring system and learn 
new skills in M&E before they could actually monitor. Thus, the monitoring work for the 
Tsunami project has been based almost entirely on the schedule of the ECB activities, 
particularly the monitoring workshops. As the ECB activities are directly linked to the 
monitoring activities, not having explicit ECB goals, objectives and activities tied to 
project-based timelines has resulted in monitoring activities that are not linked to project-
based timelines and thus project improvement. A more detailed ECB plan, linked directly 
to project-based goals and timelines, would have helped to ensure that the ECB 
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objectives and activities were based on the needs for monitoring the Tsunami project and 
thus focused on project improvement. 
 
According to King and Volkov (2005), 
 
“The first component of ECB structures is a purposeful ECB plan for the 
organization. This implies an appropriate conception of and a tailored strategy for 
evaluation in organizational policies and procedures (aligned with the 
organization’s mission, goals, and strategies); an evaluation oversight group (for 
example, the evaluation manager and Evaluation Platoon at Neighborhood 
House); and a formal ECB written document. 
 
Although it may not have been possible to develop as full of an ECB plan as described 
above (considering time and resource constraints), it could have proved helpful to have 
all of the project partners agree on a more specific set of objectives for the ECB activities 
based on specific project-based timelines.  
 
7.2 Having a budget for M&E technical support has been critical 
for ensuring the quality of the M&E system 
 
The previous section outlined how maintaining a 
manageable monitoring system has had impact on the 
robustness of the system. Nonetheless, it is important to 
stress that the M&E technical support, and having a 
budget line for M&E activities, have been paramount to 
ensuring that the monitoring system has maintained a 
level of quality (see sidebar). 
 
The total budget for the Tsunami project is CAD 
$3,715,796 – CIDA’s portion is CAD $2,535,796 and 
IDRC’s portion is CAD $1,180,000. Table 7.2 outlines 
the budget heads related to M&E activities. Six percent of the total budget has been spent 
on M&E activities.  
 
Table 7.2 M&E Budget Heads 




Consultant  Travel 
for M&E                                               
 
CAD  $49,680               1% 
Consultant Fee, CAD  $90,000            2% 
                                                 
18 The total budget for the Tsunami project is CAD $3,715,796 – CIDA’s portion is CAD $2,535,797 and 
IDRC’s portion is CAD $1,180,000. 
Budget lines for both 
internal and external 
monitoring and 
evaluation has been 










Technical Support                  
External Evaluation 
Fee:                                                    
CAD   $28,350              0.7% 
Misc. Consultant fee                                                          CAD $41,170 1% 
Travel for External 
Evaluator                                                
CAD  $24,820               0.6% 
Total CAD  $234,020 6% of Total 
Budget 
 
Specific activities and human resources that have been used to support the M&E 
activities include: (1) the contract with ASK India to facilitate the monitoring workshops; 
(2) the three-day OM workshop and follow-up support by one of the facilitators; (3) the 
technical support provided by IDRC SARO’s Evaluation Program Officer; and (4) the 
continuing support provided by the Tsunami Project Research Officer. 
 
The role that the M&E consultant has played cannot be understated. The M&E consultant 
has been the driving force behind the development of the monitoring system for the 
Tsunami project. One of the most important variables on the success of ECB activities is 
having an evaluation champion that pushes others to be excited and enthusiastic about 
evaluation (King and Volkov, 2005). The consultant has played the role of the evaluation 
champion very well, pushing the NGOs when they have needed to be pushed, and 
providing enthusiastic encouragement throughout the process. He has guided the 
development of the monitoring system and provided support on practical skills such as 
facilitation and more general topics such as societal changes and power dynamics. But 
again, probably most importantly, his encouragement and enthusiasm has resonated 
throughout the partners, and has helped to keep them motivated and positive about the 






8.0 Lessons Learned 
 
This case study provides a rich description of the donor and implementing partners’ 
experiences with the ECB and monitoring activities associated with the Tsunami project. 
While many lessons learned have been explored within Sections 5-7 of the paper, the 
following sections seek to summarize the lessons learned from the various aspects of the 
ECB and monitoring activities.  
 
• The  implementing partners’ unique organizational capacities and roles within 
the Tsunami project has created an opportunity for them to work with and help 
each other, which has proved to positively complement the formal ECB activities. 
The partners have been helping and learning from each other, which has been 
instrumental for a project that involves partners with different levels of capacities 
and different capacity needs depending on their role in the Tsunami project. 
 
• Although there were mechanisms built in the project to share the partners’ 
experiences related to a variety of technical areas, specific mechanisms to share 
experience in M&E would have also been beneficial. Although there were 
monitoring workshops that all the partners attended, it would have been beneficial 
to dedicate part of a workshop for the partners to share their experiences in 
monitoring other projects or programs. This type of exchange was done for other 
aspects of the project and seemed quite beneficial. This type of communication 
would not only have helped improve the specific monitoring activities of the 
Tsunami project, but would have also helped IDRC to gain a greater 
understanding of the partners’ experiences with monitoring techniques.  
 
• As the Evaluation Champion for the Tsunami project, the M&E consultant has 
been integral for providing motivation, support and encouragement. According to 
King and Volkov, “The value of evaluation champions is hard to overestimate. 
Although leadership is critical, so too are the activities of people who champion 
the evaluation cause (King and Volkov, 2005; p.13)”. There is little doubt that the 
M&E consultant has played the role of the Evaluation Champion – his vast 
experience, knowledge and enthusiasm for M&E, and development practice in 
general, provided a significant boost to the learning-orientation of the Tsunami 
project.  
 
• There seems to have been some confusion between project-level capacities and 
organizational-level capacities. The objective of the ECB activities for the 
Tsunami project was to build project-level capacities (i.e. to improve the Tsunami 
project), not organizational capacities. Strengthening organizational capacities 
would definitely be viewed as a positive outcome, but was nonetheless not the 
objective of the ECB activities. A purposeful ECB plan would have helped to 
target project-level capacities by basing the ECB objectives and activities on the 
specific needs for monitoring the Tsunami project. For example, a purposeful 
ECB plan could have helped to recognize how OM could have been introduced to 
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the monitoring system, and what resources were needed, so that the methodology 
would have been more useful to monitoring the Tsunami project, thus 
contributing to project-level capacities. 
 
• Developing ownership of the monitoring system among the implementing partners 
has been a challenge. However, there have been a number of mechanisms that 
have helped to strengthen ownership. 
 
(1) Developing (as much as possible) a system that reflects the 
implementing  partners’ organizational values. For example, re-
developing the LFA in participatory manner and the use of OM seemed to 
help develop greater ownership of the monitoring system among the 
implementing partners. However, whether ownership has been achieved 
with the Tsunami project is still debatable. The monitoring work for the 
Tsunami project has been driven by the donor agencies – CIDA requiring 
the use of the LFA and IDRC pushing for the use of a learning-oriented 
monitoring system. CIDA’s requirement for use of the LFA has no doubt 
placed restrictions on the partners’ control over the monitoring system. 
The LFA methodology, as with all evaluation methodologies, comes with 
it a certain set of values, principles and ways of viewing the world. 
Allowing the partners to choose their own monitoring methodology, which 
could very well be the LFA, that fits within their organizational and 
personal philosophies and also that addresses their needs in terms of how 
they value monitoring work, may have helped to increase ownership of the 
monitoring system for the Tsunami project.  
 
(2) IDRC’s and the M&E consultant’s focus  on a learning-oriented 
monitoring system. The learning-orientation emphasized by IDRC and the 
M&E consultant towards the monitoring and ECB activities has been well 
received by the partners, which has helped the partners to value and thus 
develop ownership over the M&E system. 
 
• Linking clear ECB goals, objectives and activities to specific project-based 
timelines may have helped to better manage the relationship between 
manageability and robustness of the M&E system. The Tsunami project has had 
difficulties with timelines in terms of the monitoring work, and this can partially 
be attributed to the time that has been required for the ECB activities to come to 
fruition. A purposeful ECB plan, attached to specific project-based timelines, 
could have helped to outline what was needed to achieve the monitoring goals, 
how the ECB activities would contribute to this, and from what schedule this 
would be achieved. A more detailed ECB plan, linked directly to project-based 
goals and timelines, would have helped to ensure that the ECB objectives and 
activities were based on the needs for monitoring the Tsunami project and thus 
focused on project improvement. Flexibility is important and should remain a 
priority, but nonetheless, developing a purposeful ECB plan would help to 
establish clear project-based objectives, goals and timelines for the ECB 
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activities, and as a result, help to ensure a robust, yet manageable monitoring 
system. 
 
• Incorporating specific learning objectives on M&E in a conflict environment may 
have helped the project partners in Sri Lanka to better monitoring the project 
activities in the east of the country. There is a significant amount of literature and 
best practices on conducting M&E in a conflict setting. It would have been useful 







Appendix #1: Acronyms 
 
CIDA   Canadian International Development Agency 
IDRC   International Development Research Centre 
EU   Evaluation Unit 
MSSRF  M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation 
Sarvodaya  Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement 
PM&E  Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation 
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation 
OM   Outcome Mapping 
LFA  Logic Framework Approach 
RBM  Results Based Management 
PAC  Project Advisory Committee 
P.A.  Practical Action 
EU  Evaluation Unit 
PAD  People’s Action for Development 
SPIRIT Society for Participatory Research and Integrated Training 
PPSS  Praja Pragathi Seva Sangam 
VKCs  Village Knowledge Centres 
VICs  Village Information Centres 
PMs  Progress Markers 
PAC  Project Advisory Committee 




Appendix #2: Project Timeline 
 
Time M&E Developments 
November 2005 Proposal development meeting in November 2005. 
March 2005 A couple of the project team members from both Sarvodaya and MSSRF participated in an Outcome Mapping workshop. 
March 31, 2006 CIDA and IDRC ratified a contribution agreement in the amount of CAD $3.7 million for the Tsunami Project. 
April 2006 Two sub-agreements between IDRC and the MSSRF and between IDRC and Sarvodaya were finalized in April 2006. Sarvodaya, 
in turn, signed another memorandum of agreement with Practical Action for the project activities to be undertaken in Sri Lanka. 
April 1-2, 2006 A project inception planning meeting was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka. This meeting enabled the three NGO partners to meet for 
the first time since the proposal development meeting in November 2005. The meeting enabled the project team to consult with 
one another on the technical aspect of project implementations, as well as to confirm the expectations and procedural issues 
regarding the project funding and reporting mechanisms. The meeting also prepared the project partners who needed to reaffirm 
the activities and expected level of achievements that would need to be realistically reflected in the project’s Logical Framework 
Analysis (LFA). 
May 15-17, 2006 At the first project inception planning meeting, it was realized that the geographical diversity, dissimilar cultural context, and 
varying levels of expertise and experiences among the project partners meant that they needed to carry out an inspection on the 
feasibility of achieving the desired outcomes, as well as to re-consult with their field-level staff and local community leaders, 
before a full activity planning could be finalized. As a result, another joint project planning meeting was held on May 15-17, 2006 
(also in Colombo).  
December 14, 2006 Advisors from both India and Sri Lanka convened for their first introductory project meeting held at the MSSRF, Chennai office 
on 14th Dec 2006. The one-day session had representation from CIDA India and Sri Lanka, IDRC, Executive Directors from 
Sarvodaya and Practical Action, Chairman of MSSRF, and their respective project leaders. 
5-10 March 2007 IDRC organized a five day OM Workshop in Colombo. The objective of the workshop was to build capacity of the project 
partners and IDRC project team to understand and use OM concepts in the project. The training had participants from CIDA, 
IDRC, MSSRF, Sarvodaya and P.A.  
13-14 July 2007 IDRC organized a “Project Monitoring and Evaluation workshop” primarily focusing on current status on project data collection, 
approach and tools by the partners (Monitoring I Workshop). 
August 13-15, 2007 The Monitoring II workshop in Sri Lanka, Colombo with Sarvodaya and Practical Action. Apart from establishing clarity on 
basic terminology related to monitoring and discussing the need for monitoring (to ensure constant learning and adaptation based 
on clear decision making), the process of designing monitoring system was also discussed. The participants, with the help of the 
facilitator, also went on to develop a monitoring system that included: 
      • Note on monitoring system and design including what, why, when, how to monitor and who to be involved  
      at various levels and stages including the community participants 
      • Tools and formats for data collection 
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      • Framework for data compilation, analysis and decision making 
August 16-18, 2007 The II Monitoring workshop in India. Apart from establishing clarity on basic terminology related to monitoring and discussing 
the need for monitoring (to ensure constant learning and adaptation based on clear decision making), the process of designing 
monitoring system was also discussed. The participants, with the help of the facilitator, also went on to develop a monitoring 
system that included: 
      • Note on monitoring system and design including what, why, when, how to monitor and who to be involved  
      at various levels and stages including the community participants 
      • Tools and formats for data collection 
      • Framework for data compilation, analysis and decision making 
December 11-14, 
2007 
The III monitoring workshop was organized at Pudukottai, Tamil Nadu from December 11 to 14, 2008. 
January 3-8, 2008 The III monitoring workshop was organized at Sarvodaya office from January 3 to 8, 2008. 
January 30th, 2008 Second Project Advisory Committee (PAC) meeting. 
April 6-9, 2008 The IV Monitoring workshop organized in Machilipatunm, Andhra Pradesh from April 6-9, 2008. 
May 5-9, 2008 The IV Monitoring workshop organized in Colombo, Sri Lanka from May 5-9, 2008. 
March 31, 2009 Official end of the project period. 
 40 
 
Appendix #3: Location of the Project Sites in the Indian 
Provinces  








Tuticorin Vembar, Keezha Vaipar PAD 
Ramathapuram Rosemanagar PAD 
Pudukkotai Manamelkudi, Seetharamanpattinam, 




Krishna District Machillipattinam, Nali, Sorlagundi PPSS 
East Godavri District Kakinada, Danavaipeta Yerrayapeta colony, 















Appendix #4: Location of the Project Sites in the Sri 
Lankan Districts 
 
Name of the Districts and Finalized Project Village Sites 
 
Name of the 
District  
Villages Implementing Agency 
Galle Pathegama, Brahmanawatte & 
Walhengoda 
Sarvodaya 
Matara Thallala South, Bathegama-East, Palana 
–North 
Sarvoday 
Hambantota Medilla, Andaragasaya & Wandirupuwa  Practical Action 










Appendix #5: Terms of Reference for Project Advisory 
Committee  
 
Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami Affected Communities of India and Sri Lanka 
Project Advisory Committee Mandate 
 
 The Project Advisory Committee will provide an overall guidance on issues related to 
strategic management and direction of the project. The membership of the Committee 
will be agreed upon by all the parties involved in the project (both implementing and 
funding organizations). 
 
Specifically, the Project Advisory Committee will be mandated to: 
 
1. Conduct periodic review of the activities undertaken by the project teams in India and 
Sri Lanka, and offer advice and suggestion on how to improve the effectiveness and 
outcomes of the project 
2. Meet periodically to 
• discuss the role of the project in relations to other initiatives where the 
project could benefit from, 
• offer support to the project teams by systematically endorsing the project 
accomplishments, and/or providing critical comments on how to improve 
overall project effectiveness, vision and performance, 
• discuss how the project outputs can be used towards the promotion of 
social change and policy enhancement in India and Sri Lanka, particularly 
on issues of social development, as well as natural disaster management, 
preparedness, and mitigation, 





- The Chair/Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer (or alternate) of the each of the 
implementing institutions: Sarvodaya, M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, and 
Practical Action 
- Heads of Mission for CIDA in Sri Lanka and India (or alternate) 
- The Regional Director of IDRC Regional Office for South Asia (or alternate) - One 
senior government official from a relevant department in Sri Lanka, and the State of 
Tamil Nadu, India 
- Senior Officer from the Indian Space Research Organization (To be confirmed) - 
Chairman or CEO of the ICT Agency of Sri Lanka (To be confirmed) 
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Appendix #6: Progress Markers for Grassroots NGOs 
(Please note that this is a draft and not a final version of the Progress Markers) 
 
Expect to See 
 
1. NGOs agreeing to work in remote vulnerable localities and as partners in the project 
activities of Bio-shield, Village Knowledge Centres, livelihood and community based 
Disaster preparedness 
2. NGOS signing the MOU outlining their roles in implementing the project activities 
3. Hiring and sending persons with suitable technical background on community 
mobilization and organization, bioshield, ICT and livelihood to attend the training.  
4. NGOs eliciting direct intervention from MSSRF to help establish the required 
infrastructure facilities like rent free community building accessible to all and the 
appropriate land for development of bioshield. 
5. NGOs mobilizing and orienting the community on the project concepts by creating 
awareness through village level meetings, organizing cultural events, taking the 
community for exposure and exchange visits that helps in gaining confidence of the 
community and effective implementation and functioning of the activities   
6. NGOs facilitate the formation of committees and sub-committees (Are these VLIs 
???) which jointly plan and execute the activities.  
 
Like to see NGOs: 
 
1. Carrying out internal reflections on the progress and report as per the terms 
2. periodically meet with concerned departments along with MSSRF 
3. support the community to in its management of the bio-shield and VKC 
4. Liaison with the Forest Department/ other government agencies, mobilizing resources 
from donors to expand bio-shield programmes 
5. use both electronic and print media for disseminating and sharing experiences 
6. facilitating the inclusion of women and marginalized  in the VLI, management of the 
bioshield and VRC 
 
Love to See NGOs 
 
1. sustaining the activities in the present area even beyond the project by establishing 
permanent linkages with the VLIs and providing them technical and financial inputs 
for the management of the bioshield, VKCs and livelihood programmes 
2. Accepting invitations from concerned local government and district and state 
authorities replicating the activities in new areas  
3. NGOs lobbying and advocating with the government for the issues/ rights of the 
fisher folk/ women and children/ marginalized sections and environment 

















Thirty-one trainees from 5 different organizations attended and participated 
in the workshop along with 3 IDRC Project Staff and 2 OM trainers. 
Monitoring 
Workshop I 





IDRC organized a “Project Monitoring and Evaluation workshop” primarily 




Workshop II  
• August 16 to 19, 
2007 (India); 















The M&E consultant organized and led a workshop that was used to 
establish clarity on basic terminology related to monitoring and discussing 
the need for monitoring, the process of designing a monitoring system was 
also discussed. The participants, with the help of the facilitator, then went on 





14, 2007 (India); 














• Finalization of the Log Frame (Result areas and indicators) based on 
what is feasible and achievable (to be sent to IDRC which would 
discuss this with CIDA based on an understanding shown by CIDA to 
carry out this exercise 
• The use of Monitoring system designed will have been assessed and 
refined as necessary 
• The methods, tools, frequency and persons responsible for measuring 
the qualitative indicators will have been designed, pre tested and 
finalized  
• The methodology for the use of progress markers for monitoring one 










• Not yet available 
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To be Scheduled    
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Appendix #8: List of Documents Reviewed 
Title Author 
  
Proposals and Work Plans  
Joint Final Proposal to IDRC and CIDA – Strengthening Resilience in 
Tsunami-affected Communities: Coastal Bioshields, Livelihood 
Development, and Village Knowledge Centres in India and Sri Lanka Steven Tyler 
Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami-Affected Areas of India and Sri 
Lanka: Progress Report No. 2 Steven Tyler 
Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami-affected Communities in Sri 
Lanka and India: Getting Started on Monitoring and Evaluation Plans; 
Notes for Partners Steven Tyler 
Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami-affected 
Communities of India and Sri Lanka – First Annual Workplan (2006-
07) IDRC 
  
Progress Reports  
Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami-affected 
Communities of India and Sri Lanka: Semi-Annual Progress Report 
(1st October 2006– 31st March 2007) IDRC 
Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami-affected Communities: Coastal 
Bioshields, Livelihood Development, and Village Knowledge Centres 
in India and Sri Lanka: Annual Progress Report 
(April 2006 to March 2007) MSSRF 
Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami-affected Communities: Coastal 
Bioshields, Livelihood Development, and Village Knowledge Centres 
in India and Sri Lanka: Half-yearly Progress Report 
(April 2007 to September 2007) MSSRF 
Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami-affected Communities: Coastal 
Bioshields, Livelihood Development, and Village Knowledge Centres 
in India and Sri Lanka: Annual Progress Report 
(April 2007 to March 2008) MSSRF 
Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami-affected 
Communities of India and Sri Lanka: First quarterly Progress report for 
the Sri Lanka component – From 1st of April -30th of September 2006 Sarvodaya 
Strengthening resilience in Tsunami Affected Communities in India 
and Sri Lanka: Semi-Annual Progress Report 
(1st April - 30th September 2007) Sarvodaya 
Strengthening Resilience in Tsunami-affected Communities of India 
and Sri Lanka: Semi-Annual Progress Report (1st /October/2006 – 31st 
/March/2007) Sarvodaya 
Stregnthening Resilience in Tsunami Affected Communities in Sri 
Lanka, Semi Annual Report 
1st October 2007 to 31st March 2008 Sarvodaya 
  
Workshop Reports  
Report of the visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka To Co-facilitate a Monitoring 
and Evaluation Workshop For IDRC partners And Make a partial 
assessment of Monitoring and Evaluation system 
Khilesh Chaturvedi 
(Consultant - ASK) 
"Report of the Workshop on developing Monitoring system with and 
for Sarvodaya and Practical Action, Sri Lanka" 
Khilesh Chaturvedi 
(Consultant - ASK) 
"Report of the Workshop on developing Monitoring system with and 
for MSSRF and associated NGOs (SPRIT, PAD, PPSS)" 
Khilesh Chaturvedi 
(Consultant - ASK) 
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Consultant’s Report: Outcome Mapping Training for the Strengthening 
Resilience in Tsunami -affected Communities of India and Sri Lanka Terry Smutylo 
  
Trip Reports  
Monitoring Trip Report Steven Tyler 
Trip Report Unknown 
Trip Report Katherine Hay 
Trip Report Priyanka 
Trip Report Priyanka 
Trip Report Priyanka 
Trip Report Priyanka 
Trip Report Priyanka 
Trip Report Priyanka 
Trip Report Priyanka 
Trip Report Priyanka and Phet 
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Appendix #10: Biography of Case Study Author 
 
Patrick Wray was a Research Intern with IDRC’s Evaluation Unit from September 2007 
to August 2008. Prior to joining IDRC, Patrick worked in a number of research related 
roles in both the non-profit and private sectors.  He has worked for over two years in the 
private sector working in evaluation research and he will be working with the Malawi 
Farmer’s Union starting in October 2008. 
 
Patrick’s interests include trade and development, regional integration and evaluation 
methods. Patrick has a Master’s degree in International Relations from Carleton 
University, and a Graduate Certificate in Program Evaluation from the University of 
Ottawa. 
 
